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Abstract 
Our world is ever growing, there will be higher demands on electricity, and fossil fuels cannot satisfy this demand 
without further harming the environment. Likewise, renewable energy sources such as solar and winds are still in their 
infancy and, when used alone, are not realistic solutions to meet this demand. Westinghouse Electric Company is ready 
to address higher electricity demand with the only Generation III+ reactor to receive Design Certification from the 
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the AP1000™ pressurized water reactor (PWR). Westinghouse 
Electric Company once again sets a new industry standard with the AP1000™ reactor. The AP1000™ is a two-loop 
Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) with passive safety features and extensive plant simplifications that enhance its 
construction, operation, maintenance and safety. The paper discusses the unique design features of AP 1000. 
Keywords: Generation III+ reactor; PWR; passive safety; modular design; probabilistic risk assessment; core operating 
parameters
1. Introduction 
    The AP1000 has evolved from earlier Westinghouse Electric Company LLC PWR designs. AP1000 is USNRC design 
certified and US Advanced Light Water Reactor Utility requirement compliant. There are currently a number of applications 
for combined construction and operating licenses in the US for AP1000. Four AP1000 plants are already under construction 
in China – two at Sanmen and two at Haiyang. Westinghouse and China are currently discussing plans for additional AP1000 
plants to be sited inland of China's coastal areas. Additionally, Westinghouse and the AP1000 have been identified as the 
supplier and technology of choice for no less than 14 plants that have been announced in the United States, including six for 
which engineering, procurement and construction contracts have been signed. Four of these plants have site preparations 
underway.  The AP1000 is certified by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and is the only Generation III+ reactor to 
receive such certification. The European Utility Requirements (EUR) organization also certified that the AP1000 is 
compliant with European Utility Requirements, confirming that the AP1000 can be successfully used in Europe.  
    Figures 1 and 2 provide section and plan view of the AP1000 nuclear island configuration. 
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2. Major equipment description 
    AP1000 is based on tested and proven technology [1]. The reactor coolant system (RCS) consists of two heat transfer 
circuits, with each circuit containing one steam generator, two reactor coolant pumps, and a single hot leg and two cold legs 
for circulating coolant between the reactor and the steam generators. The system also includes a pressurizer, interconnecting 
piping, and the valves and instrumentation necessary for operational control and the actuation of safeguards. 
    The RCS arrangement is shown in Figure 3 and selected plant parameters are shown in Table 1. NSSS equipment is 
located in the reactor containment. All safety-related equipment is located in containment or in the auxiliary building. These 
two buildings are on a common, seismically qualified basemat, greatly reducing the plant's seismic footprint. 
2.1 Reactor design 
    The core, reactor vessel, and internals of the AP1000 are essentially those of conventional Westinghouse PWRs. The 
reactor vessel is the same as that for a standard Westinghouse three-loop plant. The internals are also standardized, with 
minor modifications. Several important enhancements, all based on existing technology, have been used to improve the 
performance characteristics of the design. For example, there are fuel performance improvements, such as Zircaloy grids, 
removable top nozzles, and longer burnup features. This optimized fuel is currently used in approximately 120 operating 
plants worldwide.  
2.2 Steam generators 
    Two model Delta-125 steam generators are used in AP1000. There are some 75 Model F-type units in commercial 
operation, with the highest level of reliability achieved by any steam generator worldwide. This reliability record is due to 
such enhancements as full-depth hydraulic expansion of the tubes in the tube-sheets; stainless steel broached tube support  
   Fig.2. Westinghouse AP1000 Plants (plan)
   Figure 3- AP1000 Reactor Coolant System 
Fig.1. Westinghouse AP1000 Plants (Section)
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plates; thermally treated, corrosion-resistant Inconel 690 (I-690) tubing; upgraded antivibration bars to reduce wear; 
upgraded primary and secondary moisture separators; and a triangular tube pitch. Two steam generators that are very similar 
to the Delta-125 model are operating at the Arkansas station in the US.  
Table-1: Selected AP 1000 RCS Parameter 
Parameter  Doel 4/Tihange 3 AP 1000 
Net Electric Output, MWe 985 1117 
Reactor Power, MWt 2988 3400 
Hot Leg Temperature, oC (oF) 330 (626) 321 (610) 
Number of Fuel Assemblies  157 157 
Type of Fuel Assembly 17×17 17×17 
Active Fuel Length, m (ft) 4.3 (14) 4.3 (14) 
Linear Hear Rating, kw/ft 5.02 5.71
Control Rods / Gray Rods 52/0 53/16 
R/VID., cm (inch) 399 (157) 399 (157) 
Vessel flow (Thermal) 
103m3/hr (103gpm) 
67.1 (295) 68.1 (300) 
Steam Generator Surface Area, 
m2(ft2)
6320 (68,000) 11,600 (125,000) 
Pressurizer Volume, m3 (ft3) 39.6 (1400) 59.5 (2100) 
2.3. Reactor coolant pumps  
    Canned motor pumps to circulate primary reactor coolant throughout the reactor core, piping, and steam generators. Two 
pumps are mounted directly to the channel head of each steam generator. A variable speed controller is used in AP1000 for 
cold operation to compensate for the higher water density. At power the variable speed controller is disconnected so that the 
pumps operate at a constant 1800 rpm. Elimination of the pump shaft seals greatly simplifies the auxiliary fluid systems that 
support a canned motor pump, reduces required maintenance and eliminates possible accidents involving seal failures. The 
integration of the pump suction into the bottom of the steam generator channel head eliminates the crossover leg of coolant 
loop piping; reduces the loop pressure drop; enhances loop natural circulation, simplifies the foundation and support system 
for the steam generator, pumps, and piping; and eliminates the potential for uncovering the core during a small LOCA. 
2.4 Pressurizer 
    The AP1000 pressurizer is essentially the Westinghouse design used in approximately 70 operating plants worldwide. The 
AP1000 pressurizer is larger than in operating PWR’s with a volume of 59.5 cubic meters (2100 cubic feet). The AP1000 
pressurizer gives enhanced margins and operating level bands compared to operating units. 
2.5 Containment vessel 
    The 39.62 m (130 ft) diameter free-standing steel containment vessel consists of three ring sections and an upper and 
lower head. The ring sections and vessel heads are constructed of steel plates preformed in an off-site fabrication facility and
shipped to the site for assembly and installation using a large-capacity crane. The largest ring section includes the polar crane 
support and weighs approximately 658 metric tons (725 t). Each of the two heads weighs approximately 500 metric  tons 
(550 t). 
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    The containment ring sections include several sub modules fabricated in off-site facilities and attached to the appropriate
containment ring section in the onsite assembly area, prior to lifting the ring section into its final position. These include 
twelve unique circular platform sub-modules that provide a 360-degree access platform and distribution support for services 
such as electricity, HVAC, and instrumentation inside the containment above the operating deck. This 360-degree platform 
not only provides access between the upper work platforms for the two steam generators and pressuriser, but also supports 
the cable trays that distribute the cables through the containment building. 
3. Passive safety systems 
    Passive systems provide plant safety and protect capital investment. They establish and maintain core cooling and 
containment integrity indefinitely, with no operator or AC power support requirements. The passive systems meet the single-
failure criteria and probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) used to verify reliability. The passive safety systems are significantly 
simpler than typical PWR safety systems. They contain significantly fewer components, reducing required tests, inspections, 
and maintenance. The passive safety systems have one-third the numbers of remote valves as typical active safety systems, 
and they contain no pumps. Equally important, passive safety systems do not require a radical departure in the design of the 
rest of the plant, core, RCS, or containment. The passive safety systems do not require reactor coolant fluids to leave 
containment or the large network of active safety support systems needed in typical nuclear plants. These include AC power, 
HVAC, cooling water, and the associated seismic buildings to house these components.  
    This simplification applies to the emergency diesel generators and their network of support systems, air start, fuel storage
tanks and transfer pumps, and the air intake/exhaust system. These support systems no longer must be safety class, and they 
are either simplified or eliminated. For example, the essential service water system and its associated safety cooling towers 
are replaced with a non-safety-related service water cooling system.  
    Non-safety-related support systems and passive safety systems are integrated into the plant design. Licensing safety 
criteria are satisfied with a greatly simplified plant.  
Table: 2 AP 1000 Safety Margins 
Typical Plant AP1000 
-Feedline Break oC(oF)
Subcooling Margin 
>0(>0) ~78(~140) 
-SG Tube Rupture Operator actions required in 10 min Operator actions NOT required 
-Small LOCA 3" LOCA core uncovers PCT~1500oF <8"LOCA No core uncovery 
-Large LOCAPCT oC
(oF) with uncertainty  
1093 – 1204 (2000 – 2200) 1162 (2124) 
Fig.4. AP1000 RCS and Passive Core Cooling System Fig.5. Passive Containment Cooling System 
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    The passive safety systems have been sized to provide increased safety margins, especially for more probable events. 
Table 2 illustrates the improved margins.  
    The passive safety-related systems include: 
3.1 Emergency core cooling system  
    The passive core cooling system (PXS), shown in Figure 4, protects the plant against RCS leaks and ruptures of various 
sizes and locations. The PXS provides core residual heat removal, safety injection, and depressurization. Safety analyses 
(using NRC-approved codes) demonstrate the effectiveness of the PXS in protecting the core following various RCS break 
events. Even for breaks as severe as the 20.0-cm (8-in) vessel injection lines, there is no core uncovery. Following a double-
ended rupture of a main reactor coolant pipe, the PXS cools the reactor with ample margin to the peak clad temperature limit.  
3.2 Safety injection and depressurization  
    The PXS uses three sources of water to maintain core cooling through safety injection. These injection sources include the 
core makeup tanks (CMTs), the accumulators, and the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST). These injection 
sources are directly connected to two nozzles on the reactor vessel so that no injection flow can be spilled in case of larger 
breaks.  
    Long-term injection water is provided by gravity from the IRWST, which is located in the containment just above the RCS 
loops. Normally, the IRWST is isolated from the RCS by squib valves and check valves. The RCS must be depressurized 
before injection can occur. The RCS is automatically controlled to reduce pressure to about 0.83 bar (12 psig), at which point 
the head of water in the IRWST overcomes the low RCS pressure and the pressure loss in the injection lines. The PXS 
provides depressurization using the four stages of the automatic depressurization system (ADS) to permit a relatively slow, 
controlled RCS pressure reduction. 
3.3 Passive residual heat removal  
    The PXS includes one passive residual heat removal heat exchanger (PRHR HX). The PRHR HX is connected through 
inlet and outlet lines to RCS loop 1. The PRHR HX protects the plant against transients that upset the normal steam 
generator feed water and steam systems. It satisfies the safety criteria for loss of feed water, feed water line breaks, and 
steam line breaks. 
    The IRWST provides the heat sink for the PRHR HX. The IRWST water absorbs decay heat for more than one hour 
before the water begins to boil. Once boiling starts, steam passes to the containment. The steam condenses on the steel 
containment vessel and, after collection, drains by gravity back into the IRWST. The PRHR HX and the passive containment 
cooling system provide indefinite decay heat removal capability with no operator action required.  
3.4 Passive containment cooling system 
    The passive containment cooling system (PCS) provides the safety-related ultimate heat sink for the plant (see Fig. 5). The
PCS cools the containment following an accident so that design pressure is not exceeded and pressure is rapidly reduced. The 
steel containment vessel provides the heat transfer surface that removes heat from inside the containment and transfers it to 
the atmosphere. Heat is removed from the containment vessel by the continuous, natural circulation of air. During an 
accident, air cooling is supplemented by water evaporation. The water drains by gravity from a tank located on top of the 
containment shield building. 
    Analysis shows that during severe accidents the AP1000 containment remains intact. As a result, the plant has a 
significantly reduced frequency of release of large amounts of radioactivity following core damage in an accident. The PCS 
cooling capability is very reliable with its 3 way redundant (and diverse) water drain valves. In addition, even with failure of
water drain, air-only cooling is capable of maintaining the containment below the predicted failure pressure. Other 
contributing factors include improved containment isolation and reduced potential containment bypass sequences including 
steam generator tube ruptures (SGTR). This enhanced containment performance supports the technical basis for 
simplification of offsite emergency planning. 
4. Probabilistic risk assessment 
    PRA has been used interactively as a part of the design process. Many design and operation changes have been made 
based on these PRA insights. As a result, the AP1000 PRA results show very low core melt and large release frequencies that 
are significantly below those of operating plants and well below the NRC safety goals. The following shows the core melt  
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frequency (CMF) and large release frequency (LRF) per reactor year [2]. The AP1000 frequencies include shutdown events 
and external events. 
 NRC   AP1000 
CMF ~  1 E -4   4.2 E -7 / yr 
LRF ~  1 E -6   3.7 E -8 / yr 
    A major safety advantage of passive plants versus conventional PWRs is that long-term accident mitigation is maintained 
without operator action and without reliance on offsite or onsite AC power sources. The passive safety systems provide long-
term core cooling and decay heat removal without the need for operator actions and without reliance on active safety-related 
systems. For limiting design basis accidents, the core coolant inventory in the containment for recirculation cooling and  
boration of the core is sufficient to last for at least 30 days, even if inventory is lost at the design basis containment leak rate. 
PRA sensitivity studies illustrate this improvement. The following frequencies show the CMF for at-power internal events 
with and without operator action:  
 AP1000 
CMF with operator action  2.4 E -7 / yr 
CMF without operation action 1.8 E -5 / yr 
    Severe accident phenomenons have been addressed with AP1000 design features. The highly redundant and diverse ADS 
prevent high pressure core melt sequences which can challenge the containment through direct containment heating and 
steam explosions. Core concrete interactions are prevented by invessel retention of core melt debris. Hydrogen ignitors and 
passive auto-catalytic re-combiners prevent hydrogen explosions. 
5. Modular design 
    To provide quick and affordable construction methods the AP1000 utilizes a modular design technique. The major 
construction and piping and components are designed to be shipped via railcar and able to be easily assembled. These 
modules help shorten construction schedule, reduce the manpower needed in the field.  Increased factory-based 
manufacturing improves quality since major components and assemblies can be tested while in the factory. This will reduce 
the construction congestion around assembly time.  
5.1 Structural modules 
    The use of modules simplifies the construction of the reinforced concrete structures. Structural wall modules consist of 
steel faceplates connected by steel trusses. The trusses stiffen and hold together the faceplates during handling, erection, and
concrete pouring. Shear studs are then welded to the inside faces of the steel faceplates. The structural wall modules are 
anchored to the concrete base by reinforcing steel dowels or other connections embedded in the reinforced concrete below. 
After erection, concrete is finally poured between the faceplates. 
    The main structural module in containment (known as CA-01, see Fig.6) is a multi-compartment structure comprising the 
central walls of the containment internal structures. The vertical walls of the module house the refueling cavity, the reactor 
vessel compartment, and the two steam generator compartments. 
    The module can be assembled from about 40 prefabricated wall sections called structural sub modules. If necessary, these 
sub-modules are transported by rail to the plant site in sizes up to 3.7 m by 3.7 m by 25 m long. A typical sub-module weighs 
about 10 metric tonnes, but they can weigh as much as 73 metric tonnes. If barge access is available at the site, larger sub-
assemblies can be shipped. The sub modules are assembled outside the nuclear island with full penetration welds between the 
faceplates of adjacent sub-modules. Other large structural modules have been designed for rail shipment of sub-modules to 
the site. 
    The completed CA-01 module is lifted to its final location within the containment vessel by the heavy lift construction 
crane. Following placement of the CA-01 module within the containment building, the hollow wall structures are filled with 
concrete, forming a portion of the structural walls of the containment internal structures. Structural modules also include 
miscellaneous steel for connections to the building structure, other modules, and for attachment of piping, cable trays, 
ductwork, and supports that are installed in the sub-assembly area.
5.2 Mechanical modules 
    There are a large number of equipment, piping and valve modules, two examples of which can be seen in Fig.7 and Fig.8. 
In many cases, the location and orientation of the equipment are dictated by modularization considerations. The routing of 
the piping throughout the plant, for example, minimizes the construction schedule by maximizing the degree of off-site 
fabrication. 
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Fig.6. AP1000 Structural Module                                       Fig.7. AP-1000 Piping Module 
Fig.8. AP-1000 Valve Module 
    Fig. 9. Simplification of Design 
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6. Simplification of power plant design 
    Simplicity was a key concept behind the design of the AP1000. Its reactor vessel is essentially the same as those for 
Westinghouse's traditional three-loop plants.  The new design however, features 60% fewer valves, 75% less piping, 80% 
less control cable, 35% fewer pumps, and 50% less seismic building volume than a usual reactor design. Because of this 
simpler and smaller plant design, it requires less equipment and infrastructure to test and maintain.  
7. AP 1000 fuel design  
    Consistent with its functional requirements, the design characteristics of AP 1000 reactor provide large margins to safety 
limits, while utilizing proven and previously tested technologies. The fuel design of the AP1000 reactor utilizes a similar 
design approach. The basic fuel design that will be utilized has seen significant operating experience in reactors worldwide. 
This design has been further enhanced to provide additional margins, both thermal and mechanical. 
Table: 3 Comparison of AP 1000 fuel related design parameters with other designs 
Design Parameter AP1000 Typical XL Plant W 3-Loop 17×17 W 4-Loop 17×17 
uprated 
Units 
Reactor Core Heat 
Output 
3,400 3,800 2,900 3,850 MW 
Number of fuel 
bundles 
157 193 157 193  
Active core height 4.267 4.267 3.658 3.658 m 
Fuel lattice  
Fuel rods per  
bundle 
17×17×L  
264 
17×17×L  
264 
17×17  
264 
17×17  
264 
RCS System 
Pressure, nominal 
15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 MPa 
Coolant Inlet 
Temperature  
Core Outlet 
Temperature 
279.4 
324.7 
294.0 
332.2 
289.4 
330.9 
279.9 
321.0 
oC
Vessel flow rate 
Flow/Assembly 
19.03 
0.121 
25.43 
0.132 
17.89 
0.114 
24.14 
0.125 
M3/s
Minimum DNBR 
at nominal 
condition 
2.74 2.47 2.21 2.35
Nominal average 
heat flux 
628.7 571.6 650.2 702.2 kW/m2
Nominal average 
linear power 
18.77 17.06 18.67 20.18 kW/m 
Peak linear power 
– normal operation  
48.88 45.93 45.60 50.43 kW/m 
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    The core consists of three radial regions that have different enrichments; the enrichment of the fuel ranges from 2.35% to 
4.8%. The temperature co-efficient of reactivity of the core is highly negative. The core is designed for a fuel cycle of 18 
months with a 93% capacity factor.  
    AP1000 has a 157 assembly, 4.27 meter (14 foot) core. This makes the AP1000 core very similar to that in Doel-3 and 
Tihange-4. A core shroud similar to those used in Waterford 3 and the Korean fleet is employed. In addition, movable 
bottom mounted incore instrumentation has been replaced by fixed top mounted instrumentation. This results in no reactor 
vessel penetrations below the loop nozzles.  
7.1 Core operating parameters 
    The operating environment of the fuel assembly defines the forcing functions that must be accommodated in the fuel 
design. This is therefore an extremely important element of any reactor design, i.e. to create as benign an environment as 
possible for fuel operation. High axial and crossflow velocities, non uniform inlet velocity distributions, high power densities
and high temperatures are examples of aspects of reactor design that are detrimental to the performance of the fuel. The 
AP1000 reactor key design parameters are compared to existing Westinghouse designs in Table 3. It can be seen from this 
table that critical parameters such as flow per assembly (important for fuel rod vibration); temperatures (important for 
corrosion/crud deposition) are well bounded by existing Westinghouse reactor designs. Heat fluxes are comparable to 
existing Westinghouse reactors. 
7.2 Fuel assembly design 
    Westinghouse’s design philosophy for the AP1000 fuel assembly has been to start with a design that already has had 
significant exposure and excellent fuel performance, and then to further improve it to meet the standards of zero failure as 
delineated in the US Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) 2010 initiatives. Consistent with this design philosophy, 
the fuel design for AP1000 is based on the 17X17 Robust Fuel assembly (RFA) design. Two types of this design are already 
in operation. These are the 17X17RFA (12 foot active fuel length) and the 17RFA-XL (14 foot active fuel length) designs. 
The AP1000 fuel is based on the 17X17XL assembly. However, many enhancements have been made to this design in order 
to provide additional thermal margin and mechanical robustness. The key ones are identified below [3]. 
x The current Westinghouse 17X17XL designs do not have Intermediate Flow Mixing (IFM) grids. These grids have 
seen extensive experience in the 17X17 12 foot design. The AP1000 fuel assembly has four IFM grids in the top 
part of the fuel assembly. IFM grids provide additional thermal margin to crud/corrosion as well as DNB. This also 
contributes to the increase in structural rigidity of the fuel assembly. 
x The height of the grid straps in the mid grids and IFM grids, as well as the areas of contact between the grid and the 
fuel rod has been increased in order to add additional Grid-to-Rod Fretting margin and seismic resistance.  
Fig.10. AP1000 fuel features  
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x The design utilizes the Westinghouse Integral Nozzle (WIN) in the upper part of the fuel assembly. The WIN nozzle 
eliminates the top nozzles screws that had experienced some level of stress corrosion cracking in prior designs. 
x The design utilizes the Westinghouse Tube-in Tube design feature, coupled with the thicker guide thimbles that are 
already in use in the Robust Fuel Assembly designs. The Tube-in-Tube design feature is already in use in EdF 
reactors. This design has been proven to be very effective from a standpoint of significantly reducing fuel assembly 
bow and fuel assembly distortion, thereby minimizing the probability of Incomplete Rod Insertion (IRI). 
x The fuel rod has been made longer by reducing the height of the bottom nozzle. This additional space has been 
utilized to add more plenum space at the bottom of the fuel rod to increase margins to rod internal pressure limits.  
The AP1000 Fuel assembly design is schematically depicted in Fig. 10 
8. Conclusion
    The AP1000 is a simple, licensed, mature design, using proven components in an innovative and elegant approach to 
safety.  
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